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The international law to control the use of force, as it currently exists, is
incomplete, out of date, and should be changed. It is the purpose of this
comment to stimulate intelligent public and expert discussion of this ques-
tion. Recent events, such as those involving Nicaragua and El Salvador,
Grenada1 and Lebanon as well as events stretching back through the Falk-
land Islands, activities in Southern Africa, Afghanistan, the Dominican
Republic in 1965 and the earlier Cuban missile crisis, reveal this inadequacy
in international law. It has in truth been very difficult to square actions of
many states including those of the United States on several occasions, 2 with
the current U.N. Charter and international law system. The case of Nica-
ragua v. United States of America filed in the International Court of Justice
on April 9, 1984, 3 has also brought some of this to a head.
It is this inadequacy in the law that probably led some to equate what the
United States did in Grenada-which I would characterize as intervention
that can be finished quickly, which meets with popular support, restoration
*Don Wallace, Jr., is Director of the International Law Institute and Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center, and former Chairman of the Section of International Law
and Practice of the American Bar Association.
1. See, Gordon, Bilder, Rovine & Wallace, International Law and the United States Action in
Grenada: A Report, 18 INT'L LAW. 331 (1984) (hereinafter cited as "Report").
2. E.g., id. at 380.
3. See case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. United States of America), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (Provisional Measure, Order of May 10);
Judgment of 26 November 1984 (jurisdiction of Court and admissibility of the application).
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of domestic order, provision of economic assistance and departure (now
almost complete)-with what the Soviet Union has done in Afghanistan,
Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere in the name of the Brezhnev Doctrine.4
There is something wrong with a law that cannot distinguish Grenada from
Afghanistan.
II. The Existing Law and Its Inadequacy
The international law that developed in earlier centuries to deal with the
legitimacy of the use of force, either as between countries or within coun-
tries, had a good deal of muddle, confusion and imprecision.5 The League of
Nations, and then the United Nations, represented something of a break
with the earlier situation by attempting to impose more precise rules and
also international machinery to enforce those rules. 6 To be sure, the world
has changed greatly since 1945 when the United Nations, the arch of the
present international legal system, was created. In fact, the United Nations
has not eliminated the earlier muddle; it has merely changed it. 7
The need for a healthy international law, and one with which effective
United States and Western policy can co-exist, remains. The apparent lack
of synchronization between effective policy and international law was
reflected, on the occasion of the dispatch of American troops to Grenada, by
the confusion on the part of American law professors and others. Some of
the events in Nicaragua have created similiar confusion.
8
4. As originally reported in Pravda on September 26, 1968, this doctrine states that, "There
is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties have and must
have freedom to determine their countries' path of development. Any decision of theirs,
however, must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of
the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers movement, which is waging a struggle
for socialism. This means that every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people
but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets
this in placing sole emphasis on the autonomy and independence of Communist Parties lapses
into onesidedness, shirking his internationalist obligations." Reprinted in The Current Digest of
the Soviet Press (1968), XX(39), p. 10.
5. H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed., 1952), Volume II, at 152.
6. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (1954).
7. J. MURPHY, THE U.N. AND THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE 16 (1982).
8. Thus, in the case of Grenada, the reactions tended to fall into three groups:
(i) those who simply applied the law to the facts, found the action illegal and condemned it,
e.g., Abram Chayes, "Grenada Was Illegally Invaded," New York Times, November 15,
1983, p. A35;
(ii) those who considered the wisdom of our actions so overriding as to almost dismiss the
relevance of the law, e.g., Eugene Rostow, "Law 'Is Not a Suicide Pact,"' New York Times,
November 15, 1983, p. A35; and
(iii) those who fit the facts into the law and thus suggested our actions might be legal, e.g.,
Anthony D'Amato, letter to editor, New York Times, October 30, 1983, p. E19, (many
presumably did this because they believed our actions wise, some of these sounded like
official apologists).
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When the United Nations was created in 1945, many believed, or at least
hoped, that the United Nations Security Council could cope with all postwar
security problems. In fact, the United Nations Charter9 creates a monopoly
of control of the legal use of force in the Security Council. Thus, in Article 24
of the Charter, the members of the United Nations "confer on the Security
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security." The almost complete stultification of the Security Council,
because of the veto, was presumably not anticipated.
A. ARTICLE 2(4)
The legal use of force is denied the nation-state members of the United
Nations. In the words of Article 2(4) of the Charter, "All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." The refer-
ences to "international relations" and the apparent limitation of the prohibi-
tion of the use of force as "against" a state leave open the question of
whether a state may itself request another state to help it with force to
suppress domestic rebellion. The inadequate treatment of this question by
international law is one of the roots of our problems.'
°
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter provides that "Nothing con-
tained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.
.. " To be sure, the situation is not quite so simple. Thus the United Nations
has on a number of occasions suggested that practices such as apartheid in
South Africa, which might in an earlier era have been deemed "domestic"
are of interest to the international community and, indeed, in the view of
some may threaten the "international peace and security." Yet, it is fair to
say, although not all will like to hear this, that the realities of the current
nation-state system still give to the internal activities of nation-states,
however defined, a large immunity from international involvement.
There is, however, one exception to Article 2(4)'s simple norm against the
use of national force in international affairs: Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, which permits the temporary use of national force. In
addition, the Security Council may itself authorize the use of force on its
behalf ("Security Council action") under Article 53 of the United Nations
Charter. There is also a de minimis footnote dealing with "humanitarian
intervention" or more accurately "protection of nationals."
9. 59 Stat. 1031, JS No. 933, 3 Bevans 1153, done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945.




Given the sweeping proscription of Article 2(4), Article 51 has always
been the key. And yet Article 51 has always been insufficient. Article 51
provides that, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a member of the United Nations. . . ." Article 51 contemplates only the
temporary use of nation-state force. In the words of the Article, national
action shall be "immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and the responsibility of the Security Council.
" and such national action may only continue "until the Security Council
has taken the [necessary] measures ... "
Two important aspects of Article 51 should be noted: the high threshold
of an "armed attack" that must be surmounted before a nation may resort to
force (the term "aggression," which is found in Article 1(1) and 39 of the
United Nations Charter, is a broader term that is applied to the use of force
by the Security Council, and not by nation-states under Article 51)11 and the
principles of "necessity and proportionality," which, while not explicitly
mentioned in Article 51, are deeply rooted in the concept of self-defense.
Thus, force, as controlled by Articles 2(4) and 51, may only be used by a
nation if necessary and only proportionately, that is, to the extent neces-
sary-what we might call the principle of "tit for tat." This basic notion of
contemporary international law with respect to the use of force, namely that
it is to be used as late as possible and as little as possible, is reflected
throughout the structure of the Charter of the United Nations.' 2
Armed attack has been narrowly defined by almost all legal authorities
and governments. 1 3 There have been exceptions. Thus in 1949, the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, reporting out the North Atlantic Treaty
(setting up NATO), while observing that "obviously, purely internal dis-
orders or revolutions would not be considered 'armed attacks' within the
meaning of Article 5 (of the Treaty)" went on to say "however, if a
revolution were aided and abetted by an outside power such assistance
might possibly be considered an armed attack." ' 14 But "armed attack" has
not widely been deemed to cover externally-supported internal
subversion.15 This, in fact, is one of the key problems with the current
system.
Armed attack, in the widely held view, is a simple concept, possibly too
11. Definition of Aggression, U.N.G.A. Res. 3379 (XXX), Nov. 18,1975,30 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 34) 83, U.N. Doc. A/10023 (1976).
12. E.g., Chapters VI-VIII.
13. BISHOP, supra note 6, at 560.
14. S. Ex. Rep. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1949).
15. MURPHY, supra note 7, at 172.
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simple. Classic examples would be the invasions by Hitler of Poland, Bel-
gium and The Netherlands in 1939, and. the Argentine invasion of the
Falkland Islands in 1982.
To be sure, it has been recognized that the simple concept of "armed
attack" can give rise to complicated problems. Thus, for example, the
Charter preserves the "inherent" right of self-defense, and it has been
suggested that, based on history, self-defense against "armed attack" may
be anticipatory. 16 In a nuclear age the most narrow possible interpretation
of "anticipatory" seems desirable. It would be hard to fit the "anticipatory"
strike by Israel against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the Iraqi invasion
against Iran within existing rules. It may also be hard to fit aspects of the
Honduras- and Costa Rica-based attacks of the Nicaraguan contras into
Nicaragua (or assistance to the Afghan rebels) into the existing norms. And
this, whether such attacks are said to be merely a necessary and proportional
response to Nicaraguan assistance to guerillas in El Salvador, or in antic-
ipation of a Nicaraguan "attack" on El Salvador.
C. SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION: ARTICLE 53
As noted, Article 24 of the U.N. Charter gives the monopoly of the
control of the legal use of force to the Security Council. The Security
Council may authorize others to use that force on behalf of the United
Nations. Article 53 provides that, "The Security Council shall.., utilize...
regional arrangements or agencies [e.g., the OAS] for enforcement action
under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council .. " (Reference to OAS and italics added.) The United
States fitted its response in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and also its
dispatch of troops in 1965 to the Dominican Republic, into this mold. 17
Thus, after the number of U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic was
substantially increased for the purpose of bringing what amounted to a civil
war to an end and restoring "democratic order," this was ratified by the
OAS, and the U.S. maintained that this action was, in turn, "authorized" by
the Security Council. The authorization, in fact, consisted of Security Coun-
cil "non-objection" to OAS notification of its action. i8 Today, as Grenada
16. Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1842, after British forces in Canada had destroyed
an American steamer, The Caroline, while it was still in an American port on the Great Lakes
and had yet to attack Canada, protested and indicated that such anticipatory self-defense was
only legitimate where the "necessity... [was] instant, overwhelming, and leaves no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation, and must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly
within it." See Report, supra note 1, at 367 et seq.
17. CHAYES, EHRLICH, LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESs 27 (1965).
18. Id. at 44.
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revealed, the United States can no longer always obtain affirmative votes in
the General Assembly, the U.N. Security Council or the OAS. 19
D. PROTECTION OF NATIONALS
The de minimis footnote to the United Nations Charter concerns "hu-
manitarian intervention" and "protection of nationals," although the Char-
ter does not provide for either concept. Under the concept of "protection of
nationals," a country temporarily goes into another to take out its nationals
and possibly other foreigners. Examples may include the dispatch of para-
troops into Zaire some years ago to rescue missionaries, the Israeli raid at
Entebbe, President Carter's attempted Iranian rescue raid, and the early
phases of the Dominican Republic and Grenada interventions. 20 This pro-
tection of nationals is to be distinguished from the humanitarian interven-
tion occasionally practiced in the nineteenth century by a state intervening
into the affairs of another to protect the latter state's nationals. 21 As for the
narrower concept of "protection of nationals," it is de minimis in the sense
that it may be, and has been, argued that it does not violate Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter or the "territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state." 2
2
E. PRESSURES ON ARTICLES 53 AND 51
The United States, confronted by the deadlock in the Security Council
and the inadequacy of the U.N. system and wishing to rationalize its activi-
ties by law, has leaned to a strained use of Article 53 and regional organiza-
tions. On the other hand, we have resisted pressure to broaden Article 51,
which as broadened might thus be available to provide legal justification for
our actions in situations such as El Salvador, if not Grenada.
19. Report, supra note 1, at 333.
20. Id. at 331 etseq. (Grenada) and 378 (Entebbe); Letter of President Carter to the Speaker
of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Reporting on the Operation, April 26,
1980 (Iran).
21. There were a number of such foreign "protections" of various groups within the
Ottoman Empire. Indeed, a treaty between Great Britain, France and Russia, dated July 6,
1827, provided for such intervention at the invitation and on behalf of the Greeks, a subject
people within the Ottoman Empire. H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th
ed., 1955), Volume I at 312.
22. Of course, technically, it does clearly violate territorial integrity. While various "human-
itarian" notions may slowly be seeping into international law, the nineteenth century practice of
"humanitarian intervention" clearly is not part of the international law enshrined in the United
Nations Charter, and there is much that would not be allowed. Current law does not permit one
nation, for example Vietnam, to intervene with force in another, e.g., Kampuchea (Cambo-
dia), to protect the citizens (Cambodians) of that state. It does not permit one nation to
intervene in another, e.g., South Africa, to protect South African blacks who are victims of
apartheid. Current law would not have permitted another nation to intervene in Nazi Germany,
to assist the Jews and other German victims of the Nazis. See MURPHY, supra note 7, at 18.
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1. Pressure on Article 53
On a sound analysis and as noted, Article 53 must be considered under the
rubric of Security Council action. Although the Security Council has ceased
to be effective, we have tried, honorably enough, to hang the use of force on
the "legal fictions" that the Security Council continues to act, or that its
non-action is proper under the Charter. Thus we have been inclined to
permit regional organizations to act to maintain international peace and
security, to overcome the problem of the Security Council veto and dead-
lock. We believed that such action was better than the unilateral use of force
by a single nation, including the United States itself.
It is against this background that the broadened Article 53 developed.
Article 53 and related articles of the United Nations Charter refer to
regional organizations, of which the OAS is an example. Again, the OAS
Charter repeats the U.N. proscription against one state's "pushing another
one around."' 23 It is suggested that in a situation of domestic chaos or
disorder, such as the Dominican Republic and it was alleged Grenada, there
is no government or "personality" of the state to push around. Thus when
regional organizations use force in such a situation, it will be consistent with
the U.N. Charter system. Ambassador Kirkpatrick at the U.N., for exam-
ple, characterized our action in Grenada as "collective regional" action.24
The route of legal rationalization by regional organization is unsatisfac-
tory. As a practical matter, it is hard to get approval from regional organiza-
tions, such as the OAS-viz., Grenada. 25 As a political matter, when we do
gain approval from it, as we did with respect to the Dominican Republic in
1965, many remain cynical and think, in my view wrongly, we have manipu-
lated the OAS and that it is not much better than the Warsaw Pact.
2. Pressure on Article 51
Although the United States has been reluctant even to invoke Article 51, 1
would submit that developments since 1945 suggest that there is basis in
state practice for giving Article 51 a broader interpretation, or possibly for
the further development of customary international law to supplement
Article 51. The principal gap in Article 51-as the world has evolved since
23. Article 18 (originally Article 15), states:
"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements."
2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force for the United States
Dec. 13, 1951, as amended by Protocol of Amendment, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847,
entered into force for the United States Feb. 27, 1970.
24. United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release USUN 120-(83), November
2, 1983.
25. Supra note 1, at 360.
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1945, and as the controversy surrounding Nicaragua and El Salvador has
recently demonstrated-relates to externally-supported internal rebellion
and how to cope with this as a matter of international law. 26 The support that
Nicaragua is said to give the guerillas in El Salvador is an example; the
support that North Vietnam gave to the Vietcong in South Vietnam was
another; the support we give to the contras of Nicaragua (at least insofar as it
exceeds mere resistance to support for the El Salvador rebels) and the
Afghan rebels are yet others. The various examples of external military
support for internal rebels in several territories in southern Africa also come
to mind.
Presumably, purely internal conflict, if it does not affect the "mainte-
nance of international peace and security," with which the United Nations
and the Security Council are charged, is beyond the purview of the United
Nations. What is the relationship between Article 51's "inherent" right to
self-defense and the matter of external assistance with respect to internal
conflict? Pre-United Nations international law was not clear as to whether
one state might request another state to assist it in putting down a purely
domestic rebellion. 2
7
With respect to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, this may be a
lacuna. Are we threatening the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of a state if it requests us to suppress domestic rebellion? Maybe not.
On the other hand, if the rebellion is widespread, it would seem to fall within
the U.N. Charter support for popular self-determination, and external help
for its suppression would seem wrong. Further, it is clear that the Article 51
reference to the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense"
cannot be deemed to permit "collective" self-defense of a state against
purely domestic rebellion. A domestic uprising is not an "armed attack" in
the narrow sense of armed forces moving across borders. It is for these
reasons that the Soviet suppression of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the
current suppression in Afghanistan is so deeply troubling to us. 28
26. MURPHY, supra note 7, at 172.
27. Distinctions were made between isolated assaults, sporadic civil disruptions, and full-
fledged and widespread rebellion that might give rise to so-called "belligerent" status. A more
basic difficulty was political, and the European and American view were quite different. The
nineteenth century Concert of Europe not only enshrined the nation-state but to an only slightly
lesser degree the existing regime within each nation-state. Thus, Europeans believed it legiti-
mate for Russia to respond to the request of Austria-Hungary in 1849 to put down the
Hungarian rebellion. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 21, at 305. On the other hand, a prominent
American law professor, Quincy Wright, once justified the Hungarian exercise of the "right of
revolution." Deep down most of us would not think it right for another nation-state to call us in
to suppress a purely domestic rebellion. If we believed that a government might call us in to
suppress a purely domestic rebellion, we would not constantly reach for the gnat of finding
external assistance to the rebels, as we did in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and to some
extent in Grenada.
28. By contrast, pre-United Nations norms of even the United States would have permitted a
request by a government in power in the face of rebellion (such as that of Austria-Hungary in
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Conversely, if one accepts the nation-state system, one cannot accept a
legal justification for the use of force on the side of wars of national
liberation or the rebels. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the United
Nations has taken the vague notion of "self-determination" (where the unit,
whether geographic region, tribe, or otherwise whose "self" may be deter-
mined, is not precisely defined) and by resolutions suggested that it may be
furthered by "all means available"-presumably including external force.
Indeed, the governments of many newly independent nations, in Africa and
elsewhere, condemn the justification of wars of national liberation as a




Writing in Newsweek on November 7, 1983, columnist George F. Will wrote
that Americans, unlike others, do not ask of an event like Grenada, "Was
that the right thing to do?", but rather "Did we have a right to do that?" In
his view, we take an "inappropriately juridical approach to problems with
other nations. "30 But in the words of Senator Sam Nunn, "The American
people will not tolerate continuous illegal conduct," and are not prepared to
have their government violate international law. 31 Indeed, the state of our
public opipion is one of the principal reasons why international law must be
clarified and reformed.
It may be useful to remember that many of our public values and atti-
tudes, whether juridical or moral, developed when the United States was
not at the center of power to the degree that it is today. Today, we find it
difficult intellectually to relate our superpower status and our more legalist
and idealist notions. Machiavelli once distinguished the order of private
morality from the order of public morality, which was the world of his
Prince. 32 For Americans, however, our order of public morality has two
parts: (i) "the juridical," to which we might also add morals and ideas; and
(ii) effectiveness and the order of the Prince. We, and others too, judge
ourselves by our adherence to law (and ideals). But, at the same time, we are
judged by our effectiveness-by our ability to cope, as the protecting
superpower of the world, with the Soviets and with an assortment of prob-
lems, whether in Grenada, Lebanon, Central America, or elsewhere. The
1849) for foreign forces to aid the state if there had been external assistance for the rebellion. Id.
Volume I, at 305. To be sure the requested aid, to counter the prior external assistance, would
have had to be subject to the principles of necessity and proportionality.
29. MURPHY, supra note 7.
30. George Will, "The Price of Power," Newsweek, November 7, 1983, p. 142.
31. Sam Nunn, Remarks, University of Georgia, Law Day, April 14, 1984.
32. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSEs 378 (1940).
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result is a dilemma: We need exercisable force and power, which we must be
prepared to use if it is ultimately to be effective; but even as we must have
such force and power, there is a need to civilize it.
The two orders, law and political effectiveness, do not seem to be in
"sync" at this time. More deeply, not only is the law not in "sync" with
political effectiveness, but it fails in the eyes of many to meet the underlying
requirements of all law-justice and common sense.
Americans do not need to have the right to initiate the use of force in a
situation such as El Salvador. But I believe that we must have the right to
respond with counterforce, for example, by assisting El Salvador, to the
minimum extent necessary, if it wishes us to assist, against Nicaraguan
support for El Salvadoran rebels, assuming such support to be the fact. (A
common objection to the use of American or other external force is that it is
usually difficult to establish the facts to everyone's satisfaction, but this is
unavoidable in the current international system, and we cannot allow this
difficulty to eliminate entirely the possibility of using force.) Grenada, of
course, did not involve a counterforce situation but something more dif-
ficult.
The use of force is required by the breakdown of the Security Council and,
to all intents and purposes, the ability to use regional organizations in a way
that is both effective and consistent with the United Nations Charter.
Furthermore, the absence of accepted rules of law permitting the use of
force paralyzes the "juridical" side of the American mind, which does not
wish to act without the authority of law. (I hasten to add that I do not urge
the use of force but only that there should not be improper legal obstacles to
its use).
It is time once again to seek to reform international law as has been done
before, at the foundation of the League of Nations and again when the
United Nations was established. It must be done by means that are subject
to implementation and in a way that will, if not initially, at least eventually,
achieve wide acceptance. Given the current degree of divergence of opinion
among the nations of the world, at least in public forums, it will obviously
not be possible to negotiate a universal treaty like the United Nations
Charter or indeed to amend the Charter. The Security Council is subject to
the veto, 33 and the General Assembly is not suitable. The General Assem-
bly is not a legislature and cannot create law in the way that Congress does.34
While its resolutions can have an impact on the development of customary
international law, 35 it is highly unlikely, as a political matter, that the
33. United Nations Charter, supra note 9, at Article 27.
34. United Nations Charter, supra note 9, Articles 10-15.
35. Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Tentative Draft
No. 1 as revised, § 103 (1984).
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General Assembly would accept an approach such as that called for here.
Given the intellectual orthodoxies of our time, the developing countries are
not likely to acknowledge explicitly the problems of the post-colonial world
order, the security needs of the large powers, the need for "counterinterven-
tion" by force where the norms with respect to force are violated and the
Security Council cannot act, or the occasional need for actions such as those
in Grenada, even where the developing countries themselves may be the
principal beneficiaries of such actions. Indeed, the differences between the
Soviet Union and the United States, while of transcendental importance to
each and to the world, are seen by many, not only in the developing
countries, as unique to the superpowers and as irrelevant or irritating to
others-especially those in developing countries preoccupied as they are
with their own economic and social development and problems within their
own regions.
We must for the foreseeable future assume a world in which the Security
Council does not function properly. We must also acknowledge that the
current situation with respect to "regional organizations" is unsatisfactory.
On the one hand, they do not work very well (either for us or for others, e.g.,
the OAS). To the extent that they do work, however, their approval of the
use of force by the United States (or by the Soviet Union under the Warsaw
Pact) does not seem to satisfy the basic moral and normative desire that
force be only legitimately used. To be specific, Americans do not really
believe that the OAS works for the American benefit. Yet when we finally
persuade it to work, foreigners think it no different from the Warsaw Pact.
A. PROPOSED APPROACH TO REFORM
What should the United States realistically do to move things forward at
this time? I suggest a unilateral declaration, such as President Truman
produced with respect to the Continental Shelf. 36 It would be built on a
careful assessment of state practice since 1945 and, if need be, nudge it
forward somewhat. Such a declaration should be very honestly, intelligently
and carefully drafted and be reviewed with our allies in advance. I would not
see it as necessarily unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
While true rules of international law cannot be limited merely to making
the world safe for American-style democracy, possibly the rules can be
designed to prevent others from interfering in nations that strive for demo-
cratic order. After all, the United Nations includes among its purposes
individual rights, freedom, democracy, and, properly understood, self-
determination. I would also invoke the thrust of the Monroe Doctrine. I
36. Truman Proclamation, 59 Stat. 885; 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (September 28, 1945).
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submit that the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was not to create a sphere
of influence but, rather, to create a sphere of non-influence by European
powers (that is to say to exclude "influence" imposed by force). This strikes
me as an American norm that by analogy can be combined with the forward
thrust of the Charter to suggest the content of our declaration.
The rules declared must be simple, realistic and workable. While they
may restrain and shape existing and potential state behavior, it would be
naive to believe that they can radically transform it, or indeed deal with all of
our problems. They must reinforce certain existing international disciplines,
such as the balance of power. What we want is some world order, some
restraint to the prospect of nuclear war. To do so, we must have rules of law
that the United States can obey, and which we can plausibly insist the Soviet
Union and others obey.
B. THREE PROPOSED REFORMS
I suggest three rules: (1) an expanded interpretation of the Article 51
right to self-defense; (2) enunciation of a new concept of regionalism; and
(3) a statement with respect to the nuclear and strategic balance between
the United States and the Soviet Union, in such a way as to contain
realistically the operation of the balance of power. This last norm is included
for the sake of completeness. To some extent, it is an elaboration of the
notion of self-defense with each bloc wishing to justify its ability to defend
itself in order to maintain the overall strategic balance with the other bloc.
The maintenance of the strategic balance does appear to be the background
and pre-condition to all other interstate relations for the foreseeable future.
As a doctrine of strategic balance, it is not currently encompassed by the
United Nations Charter.
The delineation of the rules that we should declare follow.
1. Lower the "armed attack" threshold
Article 51 should be expanded, to be sure cautiously, to permit individual
and collective self-defense not only against armed attack but also against
internal subversion supported from the outside by force. That is to say, one
would slightly lower the threshold of offensive action that would justify
self-defense under Article 51. This would probably be no more than an
intelligent declaration of state practice as it has actually developed since
World War II. The actionable outside support, which could be legitimately
met by requested outside counterforce, would have to be by force against
the consent of a recognized government. The 1970 Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations gives
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guidance as to what this actionable outside support by force would consist
of: "organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within
[one's] territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when [such
acts] . . . involve a threat or use of force." 37 In a word, external support for
rebellion or "wars of national liberation," prohibited under Article 2(4), are
actionable under Article 51. The assistance that Baron von Steuben gave to
the American colonies would have been illegal under the United Nations
Charter and remains so.
A key side benefit of lowering the threshold and broadening the definition
of "armed attack" would be to make certain responses that are now deemed
anticipatory no longer such and would allow them, so long as they are
necessary and proportional. Thus, it would permit some actions against
Nicaraguan support for El Salvador guerillas as long as this was necessary
and proportional, on the assumption that Nicaragua was, in effect, engaged
in an attack against El Salvador.
With an expanded definition of armed attack, would all matters still be
taken to the Security Council? Presumably, yes. Yet in reality, the Security
Council might not act. We might settle for non-objection by the Security
Council. Article 51 stands for the grim realization that force is used, and the
belief that only the use of counterforce or the threat of counterforce can
realistically deter force. Given, in effect, a Security Council-less world, this
may be truer than we wish to believe. The expanded norm, no less than the
current Article 51, would not justify intervention, but only-and this is and
must remain more than words-" counter-intervention." Necessity and
proportionality would remain the rule.
This reformed Article 51 would not encompass the notions of "humani-
tarian intervention" asserted in the nineteenth century. State intervention,
by force, to assist the Cambodians in Kampuchea, or in the 1930s for the
victims of Nazi Germany, would remain illegal, as would such intervention
to assist the victims of apartheid in South Africa, although apartheid has
been condemned by the General Assembly as a threat to international peace
and security.38 Some may find this conclusion troublesome, but the fact is
that Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force in international relations. There is
no question that if the United States were to use force, for example, on the
side of blacks in South Africa that that would represent the use of force
against the state of South Africa, as prohibited by Article 2(4). Moreover, it
37. See 9 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1292 (1970).
38. MURPHY, supra note 7, at 93
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is obvious that Article 2(4), indeed, the entire United Nations system,
enshrines the nation-state system in which one state is not to use force
against another, no matter how distasteful its internal conditions.
2. Regionalism Revised
The American use of troops in Grenada over a year ago does not come
under the first norm, as there was not external attack on it by Cuba, et al. Let
us accept that the existing situation with respect to regional organizations
and their relationship to the Security Council is not satisfactory. Would a
revised definition of regionalism cover the facts of Grenada? I would define
regionalism, which I would not relate to regional organizations, to permit
spheres of non-influence by others (which, as I have noted, is how I would
characterize the principal thrust of the Monroe Doctrine) rather than
spheres of influence as such. One would not, however, limit these spheres,
in the case of the United States, to the Western Hemisphere: a situation such
as Grenada may arise elsewhere. In a situation of genuine domestic chaos-
and the facts in Grenada can more plausibly be read as coup and attempted
establishment of government power by tough men, rather than chaos-
where there is a request from an overwhelming preponderance of the
neighbors, whether organized in a regional organization or not, and/or a
request by the remnant of the legitimate duly constituted authority surviving
the chaos (e.g., Sir Paul Scoon), 39 I believe that the United States, or
another nation, should be legally able to intervene to restore order if its
intervention is temporary. I do not believe that a right of regional interven-
tion would be limited to or automatically follow from a request by an
elected-assuming at least that degree of democratic viability-govern-
ment. International law is not built on mere popularity and polltaking. Some
have justified our action in Grenada because of the "euphoria" that the
Grenadans have shown, presumably based on their hope that we would
provide more order, and certainly more economic assistance, than their
leaders did. But in a situation of true chaos, there may not be anyone in
authority to make a request; a request from an overwhelming preponder-
ance of neighbors should suffice.
External involvement, whether Soviet, Cuban or similar, in the "chaos"
would not be legally necessary. On the other hand, such involvement, or the
threat thereof, might provide a realistic underlying policy rationale for the
United States to exercise its rights under this rule of law-to assure the
"non-influence" of others. A related policy rationale for this might be our
belief that once the Soviets do become involved and establish a regime
39. Supra note 1, at 378.
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firmly in power, like a ratchet, they do not get out (mere political alliances as
in Egypt in the past or Syria in the present are not the same; the withdrawal
in 1955 from an Austria committed to neutrality may be an exception), and
slowly but surely the possibilities for self-determination by the pre-existing
nation-state and/or its restoration wane. The Brezhnev Doctrine may be
seen as the final confirmation of this.
The principle of the new norm is "non-influence (by force)." It is to
prevent an external power from using force in a situation of chaos to impose
itself. Under such a norm, the Soviet Union could presumably intervene in
Eastern Europe to prevent external force from being imposed, if there is a
request from legitimate internal authority, or possibly the neighboring East
European states. But this is quite different from interfering to suppress a
purely domestic uprising as certainly seems to have been the case in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afghanistan today.
Who determines these spheres of non-influence and are they fixed geo-
graphically for all time? We have seen that ours is not. The answer to the
question comes from the political definition of the sphere. If France has
political influence and authority in its former African territories and is
requested to come in temporarily to exclude external force, it may do so
under the new norm.
What about support for the Afghan rebels? The facts would appear to
show that Afghanistan is not, as a political matter, within the sphere of the
Soviet Union, as Eastern Europe has been. Therefore, the Soviet Union
would have no right to interfere to exclude external force in support of
rebels. And the Soviet suppression of domestic rebellion is unjustifiable.
Under the proposed norm, we might contemplate a ratchet effect with the
non-Soviet sphere growing so as to realize the universal democratic aspira-
tions that we hold and which the United Nations Charter reflects for all the
world, including the Soviet sphere. Again, this is a political matter to be
further and carefully considered before the issuance of the declaration.
3. Strategic Balance
What rules would be established with respect to the U.S./U.S.S.R.
strategic balance? The NATO declaration of December 19, 1983, provides a
useful guide. It says of NATO that:
"Our alliance threatens no one. None of our weapons will ever be used except in
response to attack. We do not aspire to superiority, neither will we accept that
others would be superior to us. We are determined to ensure security on the basis
of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. We extend to the Soviet Union
and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring
about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium,
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moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open,
comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advan-
tage." This language might be tightened into a legal norm.
In the absence of a Security Council functioning as originally anticipated,
a norm with respect to the strategic balance is important. Although the
United Nations Charter does not articulate such a norm or any rules with
respect to it, presumably the Security Council, if it had functioned as
anticipated with respect to the "maintenance of international peace and
security" could have acted with respect to violations of it, too.
As already noted, this is more a political norm. It is not expected to apply
to something so specific as the installation of Pershing missiles in Germany.
And, there would be no legal questions as to whether the United States had
waived its rights against the Soviet Union because it did not take issue with
the installation of the SS-20 missiles more quickly. So, too, the discussions in
the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks and the SALT and START
talks cannot be subject to a strict legal rule.
IV. Conclusion
This comment is about future global behavior and, more specifically,
American behavior and the relevance to that behavior of international law
on the use of force. I believe, very strongly, that the United States must take
a political initiative so that we will not in the future be subject to the intense
criticism and questions, both at home and abroad, in some cases from
people who do not wish us ill, as to the legal character of such events as
Grenada and Nicaragua.
We must start now to reform international law on the use of force. The
fact that American behavior, including the use of force, must be satisfactory
to its own public opinion requires no less. Indeed, it may be that the opinion
of the American public is the main forum in which international law is
important, as Senator Nunn's remarks may suggest.
40
One of America's strengths has been to seek to promote international
justice and law. We do not have to cease to do so because we have become a
superpower. To be sure, the task may be more difficult and require greater
care and precision of us than in the past.
It is in our interest, and everyone else's to try to salvage and create from
the present situation a sound international law system. To that end, we
should press ahead with a declaration of a just and effective set of interna-
40. Supra note 3.
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tional law rules to control the use of force. Only the United States can
provide the sustained normative lead. We will be happier with ourselves if
we do so and many others in the world will be happier with us also. We
should seek the high ground.
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